Zcash in Simplified Technical English

This page is the Simplified Technical English version of ZIP 1015. The source ZIP is the normative text. Read the writing rules to understand the marked words.

ZIP 1015: Block Subsidy Allocation for Non-Direct Development Funding

ZIP: 1015
Title: Block Subsidy Allocation for Non-Direct Development Funding
Owners: Jason McGee <aquietinvestor@gmail.com>
        @Peacemonger (Zcash Forum)
        Kris Nuttycombe <kris@nutty.land>
Credits: @GGuy (Zcash Forum)
         Daira-Emma Hopwood
         Jack Grigg
         Skylar Saveland
Status: Active
Category: Consensus Process
Created: 2024-08-26
License: MIT
Pull-Request: <https://github.com/zcash/zips/pull/881>

Terminology

On this page, STE words are in the place of the BCP 14 key words of the source. Refer to the key word table.

Zcash Community Advisory Panel (ZCAP)
The panel of community members that the Zcash Foundation assembled. A description of the panel is at [zcap].
Zcash Community Grants (ZCG)
The committee that decides on the funding of grants for the Zcash ecosystem. This committee is selected by the Zcash Community Advisory Panel or a successor process. (An example of a successor process is a process that FPF sets up.)
Financial Privacy Foundation (FPF)
The non-profit foundation company limited by guarantee of that name. Its place of incorporation is the Cayman Islands.
Autonomous Entities
Groups that get operations, administrative and financial management support from FPF. These groups are:
  • Committees.
  • DAOs.
  • Teams.
  • Other groups.

Abstract

In this ZIP, we propose to allocate a percentage of the Zcash block subsidy after the halving of November 2024. This percentage is split between Zcash Community Grants (ZCG) and an in-protocol "lockbox". The "lockbox" is a separate pool of issued funds that the protocol tracks. ZIP 2001: Lockbox Funding Streams [zip-2001] contains a description of it.

At this time, no disbursement mechanism is defined for this "lockbox". In a future ZIP, the Zcash community will have to decide on and specify a suitable decentralized mechanism for withdrawals from this lockbox. The purpose of this mechanism is to make these funds available to fund grants to ecosystem participants.

The proposed lockbox is a solution to significant issues that were observed with ZIP 1014 [zip-1014]. Examples of these issues are:

The exact disbursement mechanism for the lockbox funds is not decided at this time. A future ZIP will contain it. But the goal is to use a decentralized mechanism. The purpose of this mechanism is to make sure of community involvement, and to make sure that funding is efficient and project-specific.

The intention of this approach is a possible improvement in these areas:

Motivation

Under the pre-existing consensus rules, 100% of the block subsidies go to miners from the second Zcash halving in November 2024. Under these rules, no more funds go automatically to other entities.

Thus, it is possible that the community does not take action to approve new funding that comes from the block subsidy. In that case, it will probably be necessary for the existing teams for these purposes to find other sources of funding:

If these teams do not get such funding, their ability to continue to serve the Zcash ecosystem will probably decrease. Thus we propose to set aside a portion of the block subsidy to fund development. This will help make sure that both existing teams and new contributors can get funding in the future.

It is important to balance these two things:

Also, it is necessary to continue to promote decentralization and the growth of independent development teams.

For these reasons, the Zcash Community wants to set up a new Zcash Development Fund after the second halving in November 2024. The intent is to put in place a more decentralized mechanism for the allocation of development funds. The alternatives in this ZIP are intended to address the issues that follow:

  1. Regulatory Risks: The current model includes direct funding of US-based organizations. With this funding, there is a possible risk of regulatory scrutiny from entities such as the SEC. This scrutiny is a legal risk to the Zcash ecosystem.
  2. Funding Inefficiencies: In the current model, organizations get funds directly, instead of specific projects. Thus the development priorities of those organizations and the priorities of the community can possibly be different. Also, if organizations are certain to get funds whatever their performance, there is little incentive for them to achieve key performance indicators (KPIs). In that case, there is also little incentive for them to agree with community sentiment. In a possible future system, resources go directly to projects instead of organizations. Such a system can help to decrease inefficiencies and to bring development efforts closer to community priorities.
  3. Centralization Concerns: In the current model, the decision-making power is in a few organizations. This is against the decentralized ethos of block chain technology. Traditional organizational structures with boards and executives have single points of failure. Also, with these structures, the community has less involvement in funding decisions.
  4. Community Involvement: In the current system, the community has minimal formal input about the projects that are best to fund. Thus the funded projects and the community priorities are not in alignment.
  5. Moving Towards a Non-Direct Funding Model: There is strong community support for a non-direct Dev Fund funding model. If funds go to a Deferred Dev Fund Lockbox, there is an incentive to develop a decentralized mechanism for the disbursement of the locked funds.
  6. Limited Runway: ZCG does not have the financial runway that ECC/BP and ZF have. Thus, ongoing funding to ZCG will help make sure that the Zcash ecosystem has an active grants program.
  7. Promoting Decentralization: If a portion of the Dev Fund goes to Zcash Community Grants, small teams continue to get funding to contribute to Zcash. Two other options have a disproportionate effect on grant recipients: to let the Dev Fund expire, or to put 100% into a lockbox. This hybrid approach promotes decentralization and the growth of independent development teams.
  8. Mitigating Regulatory Risks: The Financial Privacy Foundation (FPF) is a non-profit organization that is incorporated and based in the Cayman Islands. This ZIP has less direct funding of US-based organizations. Thus the possible regulatory scrutiny and legal risks are less.

The aim of this ZIP is to address these issues. Through this, the aim is to make sure of sustainable, efficient, and decentralized funding for essential Zcash ecosystem activities.

Requirements

  1. In-Protocol Lockbox: The alternatives in this ZIP depend on the Lockbox Funding Streams proposal [zip-2001].
  2. Regulatory Considerations: To keep regulatory risks to a minimum, we recommend that the allocation of funds does not include direct funding of specific organizations. To support the long-term sustainability of the funding model, we recommend that compliance with applicable laws and regulations is possible and encouraged in the design.

Non-requirements

The considerations that follow are explicitly deferred to future ZIPs. This ZIP does not include them:

  1. Disbursement Mechanism: The exact method to disburse the accumulated funds from the lockbox is not defined in this ZIP. The design, implementation, and governance of the disbursement mechanism will be in a future ZIP. This includes these specifics:
    • How funds will be allocated.
    • The voting or decision-making process.
    • The structure of the decentralized mechanism (such as a DAO).
  2. Regulatory Compliance Details: This ZIP contains an outline of a possible decrease in regulatory risks if direct funding of US-based organizations is avoided. But it does not contain details of specific regulatory compliance strategies. It will be necessary for future ZIPs to address how the disbursement mechanism complies with applicable laws and regulations.
  3. Impact Assessment: A portion of the block subsidy is reallocated to the lockbox. The long-term effect of this reallocation on the Zcash ecosystem is not analyzed in this ZIP. This includes its effect on miners, developers, and the broader community. In later proposals, it will be necessary to evaluate the outcomes, and to make necessary adjustments from real-world feedback and data.

Specification

Development Funding Recipients

Lockbox

The "lockbox" is a pool of issued funds that the protocol tracks. ZIP 2001: Lockbox Funding Streams [zip-2001] contains a description of it. At this time, no disbursement mechanism is defined for this "lockbox". In a future ZIP, the Zcash community will have to decide on and specify a suitable decentralized mechanism for withdrawals from this lockbox. The purpose of this mechanism is to make these funds available to fund grants to ecosystem participants.

Zcash Community Grants (ZCG)

The stream for ZCG is intended to fund independent teams that enter the Zcash ecosystem, to the extent that such teams are available and effective. The funds are for these teams to do major ongoing development (or other work) for the public good of the Zcash ecosystem.

The ZCG Committee is given the discretion to allocate funds to major grants. The ZCG Committee also has the discretion to allocate funds to a diverse range of projects for the advancement of these aspects of Zcash:

  • Usability.
  • Security.
  • Privacy.
  • Adoption.

These projects include:

  • Community programs.
  • Dedicated resources.
  • Other projects of varying sizes.

The Financial Privacy Foundation (FPF) must receive and administer the funds. With the additional constraints that follow, FPF must disburse them for grants and expenses reasonably related to the administration of the ZCG program:

  1. These funds must be used only to issue Zcash Community Grants to one of these recipients:

    • External parties that are independent of the FPF.
    • Autonomous Entities that operate under the FPF umbrella.

    Also, these funds can be used for expenses reasonably related to the administration of Zcash Community Grants. FPF must not use these funds for its internal operations, or for any direct expenses not related to the administration of Zcash Community Grants.

  2. We recommend that ZCG supports well-specified work that the grantee proposes, at reasonable market-rate costs. Grants can be of any duration, or they can continue with no duration limit. We recommend that grants of indefinite duration are reviewed periodically for continuation of funding. (The schedule of these reviews is a schedule that the Zcash Community Grants Committee considers applicable for the value and complexity of the grant.)

  3. We recommend that priority goes to major grants that support teams with a substantial (current or prospective) continual existence, and set them up for long-term success. This priority is subject to the usual grant award considerations. Examples of these considerations are:

    • Impact.
    • Ability.
    • Risks.
    • Team.
    • Cost-effectiveness.

    We recommend that priority goes to major grants that support ecosystem growth. Examples of ways to support ecosystem growth are:

    • Mentorship.
    • Coaching.
    • Technical resources.
    • The creation of entrepreneurial opportunities.

    If one proposal substantially duplicates the plans of another proposal, we recommend that priority goes to the originator of the plans.

  4. We recommend that the ZCG committee funds only projects that further the Zcash cryptocurrency and its ecosystem, within the limits of any applicable jurisdictional requirements. (This scope is more specific than to further financial privacy in general.)

  5. ZCG awards are subject to approval by a ZCG Committee that has five seats. The ZCG Committee must be selected by the ZF’s Community Advisory Panel or a successor process. (An example of a successor process is a process that FPF sets up.) Elections must be staggered to make sure that the Committee has continuity.

  6. The funding decisions of the ZCG Committee will be final. No approval from the FPF Board is necessary for them. But a decision is subject to veto if FPF judges that the decision violates one of these:

    • Cayman law.
    • The reporting requirements of the FPF, and its other (current or future) obligations under the Cayman Islands' Companies Act (2023 Revision) and Foundation Companies Law, 2017.
  7. ZCG Committee members must have a one-year term. They can sit for reelection. The ZCG Committee is subject to the same conflict of interest policy as the FPF Board of Directors. That is, members must recuse themselves when they vote on a proposal and have a financial interest in it.

    For each of these organizations, a maximum of one person with an association with that organization can sit on the ZCG Committee:

    • BP/ECC.
    • ZF.
    • FPF.

    Here, “association” means one of these relations:

    • A financial interest.
    • Full-time employment.
    • To be an officer.
    • To be a director.
    • An immediate family relationship with any of the above.
  8. A portion of the ZCG Slice must be allocated to a Discretionary Budget. The funds of this budget can be disbursed for expenses reasonably related to the administration of the ZCG program. The amount of funds allocated to the Discretionary Budget must be decided by the ZF’s Community Advisory Panel or successor process. The ZCG Committee must approve each disbursement of funds from the Discretionary Budget.

    Examples of expenses related to the administration of the ZCG program are:

    • Payment for operational management and administration services that support the purpose of the Zcash Community Grants program. These include administration services that FPF supplies.
    • Payment to third party vendors for services related to domain name registration, or the design, website hosting and administration of websites for the ZCG Committee.
    • Payment to independent consultants to develop requests for proposals that are consistent with the ZCG program.
    • Payment to independent consultants for expert review of grant applications.
    • Payment for sales and marketing services to promote the ZCG program.
    • Payment to third party consultants to do activities that support the purpose of the ZCG program.
    • Reimbursement to members of the ZCG Committee for reasonable travel expenses, including transportation, hotel and meals allowance.
  9. A portion of the Discretionary Budget can be allocated to give reasonable compensation to members of the ZCG Committee. The compensation of Committee members must be limited to the hours that are necessary to do the work of their positions successfully. This compensation must also be consistent with the scope and responsibilities of their roles. The FPF must administer the allocation and distribution of compensation to committee members. The compensation rate and hours for committee members must be decided by the ZF’s Community Advisory Panel or successor process.

  10. The decisions of the ZCG Committee about the allocation and disbursement of funds from the Discretionary Budget will be final. No approval from the FPF Board is necessary for them. But a decision is subject to veto if the FPF judges that the decision violates one of these:

    • Laws.
    • FPF reporting requirements, and other (current or future) obligations under Cayman Islands law.

FPF must have a contractual obligation to do these two things:

  • Recognize the ZCG slice of the Dev Fund as a Restricted Fund donation under the constraints above (suitably formalized).
  • Keep separate accounting of the balance and usage of this slice, under its Transparency and Accountability obligations that are defined below.

ZCG must try to define target metrics and key performance indicators. We recommend that the ZCG Committee uses these in its funding decisions.

Furthering Decentralization

FPF must do periodic reviews of the items that follow, with consideration of the input and recommendations of the ZCG Committee:

  • The organizational structure of the ZCG program and committee.
  • The performance of the ZCG program and committee.
  • The effectiveness of the ZCG program and committee.

As part of these periodic reviews, FPF must commit to explore the possibility to change ZCG into an independent organization, if these conditions are true:

  • It is economically viable.
  • It is consistent with the interests of the Zcash ecosystem and prevailing community sentiment.

In any transition toward independence, priority must go to keeping or increasing the decentralization of the Zcash ecosystem. The newly formed independent organization must make sure that decision-making processes stay:

  • Community-driven.
  • Transparent.
  • Responsive to the changing requirements of the Zcash community and ecosystem.

To promote geographic decentralization, we recommend that the new organization keeps its domicile outside of the United States.

Transparency and Accountability

FPF must accept the obligations of this section that follow, on behalf of ZCG:

  • Publication of a ZCG Dashboard. The dashboard gives a snapshot of the current financials of ZCG and of the disbursements to grantees.
  • Bi-weekly meeting minutes that record the decisions of the ZCG committee about grants.
  • Quarterly reports. Each report gives details of future plans, of execution on previous plans, and of finances (balances, and spending by major categories).
  • An annual detailed review of the performance and the future plans of the organization.
  • An annual financial report (IRS Form 990, or substantially similar information).

BP, ECC, ZF, FPF, ZCG and grant recipients must promptly disclose any security or privacy risks that can have an effect on users of Zcash. (Where applicable, they do this by responsible disclosure under confidence to the related developers.)

We recommend that all substantial software that was developed with funds from the Dev Fund is released under an Open Source license. The definition of an Open Source license is from the Open Source Initiative [osd]. The preferred license is the MIT license.

Enforcement

FPF must make a contractual commitment with these terms:

  • FPF fulfills these obligations on behalf of ZCG, and the prescribed use of funds.
  • If a substantial violation is not promptly remedied, the result will be a modified version of Zcash node software. In this version, the Dev Fund slice of ZCG is removed and allocated to the Deferred Dev Fund lockbox.

Funding Streams

  • 12% of the block subsidy is distributed to the lockbox.
  • 8% of the block subsidy is distributed to the Financial Privacy Foundation (FPF). This portion is for the express use of the Zcash Community Grants Committee (ZCG), to fund independent teams in the Zcash ecosystem.

From the activation of this ZIP, the complete set of funding streams for Mainnet is:

StreamNumeratorDenominatorStart heightEnd height
FS_FPF_ZCG810027264003146400
FS_DEFERRED1210027264003146400

The set of funding streams for Testnet is:

StreamNumeratorDenominatorStart heightEnd height
FS_FPF_ZCG810029760003396000
FS_DEFERRED1210029760003396000

References

[BCP14]
Information on BCP 14 — "RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" and "RFC 8174: Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"
[osd]
The Open Source Definition
[zip-1014]
ZIP 1014: Dev Fund Proposal and Governance
[zip-2001]
ZIP 2001: Lockbox Funding Streams
[zcap]
Zcash Community Advisory Panel