This page is the Simplified Technical English version of ZIP 1012. The source ZIP is the normative text. Read the writing rules to understand the marked words.
ZIP 1012: Dev Fund to ECC + ZF + Major Grants
ZIP: 1012 Title: Dev Fund to ECC + ZF + Major Grants Owners: Eran Tromer <eran@tromer.org> Status: Obsolete Category: Consensus Process Created: 2019-11-10 License: MIT Discussions-To: <https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/dev-fund-proposal-dev-fund-to-ecc-zfnd-major-grants/35364> Pull-Request: <https://github.com/zcash/zips/pull/291>
Abstract
This ZIP contains a structure for the Zcash Development Fund. In this ZIP, the Dev Fund starts in Network Upgrade 4 and continues for 4 years. The Dev Fund is 20% of the block rewards. It has 3 slices:
- 35% for the Electric Coin Company.
- 25% for the Zcash Foundation (for internal work and grants).
- 40% for more "Major Grants" for large-scale long-term projects. The Zcash Foundation decides on these grants, with more input and more examination from the community.
The maximum funding for each slice is $700k/month. Governance and accountability are based on existing entities and legal mechanisms. Governance that is increasingly decentralized is encouraged.
Motivation
From the first Zcash halving in October 2020, by default 100% of the block rewards will be allocated to miners. No more funds will be automatically allocated to research, development and outreach. As a result, it is possible that no substantial new funding will be available to the existing teams that are dedicated to Zcash. These teams are:
- The Electric Coin Company (ECC).
- The Zcash Foundation (ZF).
- The many entities that the ZF grant program funds.
It is necessary to balance two items. The first item is incentives for the security of the consensus protocol (that is, mining). The second item is other crucial aspects of Zcash security and functionality, for example development and outreach.
Also, it is necessary to balance two other items. The first item is support for the ongoing work of the current teams that are dedicated to Zcash. The second item is encouragement for decentralization and for the growth of independent development teams.
Difference from Matt Luongo's proposal
This ZIP is based on the Decentralizing the Dev Fee proposal of Matt Luongo. That proposal has similar motivations. The major changes are as follows:
- One Dev Fund slice is intended for external recipients (other than ECC, ZF and existing ZF grants). This slice can be used to fund ECC if no competitive alternatives become available. The purpose is to decrease unwarranted loss of existing capabilities.
- For simplicity, this slice is combined with the existing grant system of the Foundation. But this slice also has these items:
- Explicit requirements to achieve its goals.
- Independent advisory input.
- A Restricted Funds mechanism to enforce these requirements.
- The coin value cap of the "easing function" is removed. In its place, each slice is capped at a funding target of $700k/month. Any excess is kept in a reserve. The excess can be withdrawn from the reserve only to keep the funding target in the future.
- The transparency and accountability requirements are stronger. They are also made consistent across ECC, ZF and major grantees.
- The supervisory role of ZF to determine the "principal developer" is removed. The principal developer is fixed as ECC. (A change to this is sufficiently dramatic to justify a fork.)
- Small differences in the prescribed changes to the ZF board.
- A call for the development of decentralized voting and governance, and incentives for this development.
- Clarity and brevity.
Requirements
We recommend that the Dev Fund is used to encourage decentralization of the work and funding. The method is support for new teams that are dedicated to Zcash.
The Zcash ecosystem has existing teams and capabilities. Unless and until concrete opportunities occur to create even greater value for this ecosystem, we recommend that the Dev Fund is used to keep them.
We recommend that no single entity is a single point of failure. A single point of failure is an entity whose capture or failure effectively prevents effective use of the funds.
We recommend that major funding decisions are based on inputs from domain experts and applicable stakeholders, to the extent that this is feasible.
We recommend that the monetary emission curve stays the same with the Dev Fund mechanism. (In particular, we recommend that the mechanism includes no irrevocable burn of coins.)
If the value of ZEC jumps, we recommend that the Dev Fund recipients do not get permission to use excessive amounts of funds wastefully. Conversely, because of market volatility and eventual halvings, it is desirable to create rainy-day reserves.
We recommend that there is no decrease in the financial privacy or security of users because of the Dev Fund mechanism. In particular, we recommend that users do not have to expose their coin holdings because of the mechanism. Also, we recommend that users do not have to keep access to secret keys for much longer than they otherwise do. (Thus, some forms of voting are excluded. Some forms of coin disbursement to past or future miners are also excluded.)
We recommend that the new Dev Fund system is simple to understand and realistic to implement. In particular, we recommend that the execution of the system does not depend on the creation of new mechanisms (for example, election systems) or new entities (for governance or development). But when these mechanisms and entities are built, we recommend that every effort is made to support them and use them.
Comply with the legal, regulatory and taxation constraints in the applicable jurisdictions.
Non-requirements
General on-chain governance is outside the scope of this ZIP.
Rigorous voting mechanisms are also outside the scope of this ZIP. This applies to all of these types:
- Coin-weighted.
- Holding-time-weighted.
- One-person-one-vote.
But this ZIP contains prescribed room to integrate these mechanisms when they are available.
Specification
Dev Fund allocation
From the first Zcash halving in 2020 until the second halving in 2024, 20% of the block rewards will be allocated to a "Dev Fund". The Dev Fund has these three slices:
- 35% for the Electric Coin Company (the ECC slice).
- 25% for the Zcash Foundation, for general use (the ZF-GU slice).
- 40% for more "Major Grants" for large-scale long-term projects (the ZF-MG slice).
The details are in the sections that follow. The fund flow will be implemented at the consensus-rule layer: in each block, the corresponding ZEC will be sent to the designated address. This Dev Fund will end at the second halving, unless it is extended or changed by a future ZIP.
ECC slice (Electric Coin Company)
This slice of the Dev Fund will be paid to ECC.
ECC must accept a firm obligation to use the Dev Fund only in support of the Zcash cryptocurrency and its community.
In particular, ECC must commit that it does not distribute the Dev Fund proceeds to its partners ("shareholders"), other than for these two purposes:
- Fair-market-value compensation for specific new work.
- To cover pass-through tax obligations to partners that are caused by the receipt of the Dev Fund by ECC.
(ECC is encouraged to change to a corporate structure where the taxes of item 2 do not apply.)
This obligation must be made irrevocable, for example in the corporate governance structure of ECC (that is, its Operating Agreement) or in contractual obligations.
ZF-GU slice (Zcash Foundation, for general use)
This slice of the Dev Fund will be paid to ZF. ZF will use it at its discretion for any purpose in its mandate to support Zcash and financial privacy. These purposes include:
- Development.
- Education.
- Support of community communication on-line and through events.
- Collection of community sentiment.
- Grants to external parties for all of the above.
ZF can award grants as profit-sharing contracts. In that case, any profits that result will be added to the ZF-GU slice. (The purpose is to fund its ongoing operations and any future grants.)
ZF-MG slice (Zcash Foundation, for major grants)
This slice is intended to fund independent teams that enter the Zcash ecosystem, to the extent that these teams are available and effective. The funded work is major ongoing development (or other work) for the public good of the Zcash ecosystem.
ZF will receive and administer the funds. ZF will disburse them as "Major Grants" in the framework of the ZF grant program. But these additional constraints apply to the Major Grants:
- These funds can be used only to issue Major Grants to external parties that are independent of ZF. ZF must not use them for its internal operations and direct expenses.
- We recommend that Major Grants are for well-specified work that the grantee proposes, at reasonable market-rate costs. They can be of any duration, or ongoing without a duration limit. But they have semiannual review points for the continuation of funding.
- Major Grants can be issued to ECC only if no other party is available and can do the specified work with similar effectiveness and cost. (The intent is that eventually ECC will not receive Major Grants.)
- Priority will be given to Major Grants for new teams that have substantial continual existence (current or prospective). The purpose of these grants is to strengthen these teams and to prepare them for long-term success. This priority is subject to the usual considerations for a grant award. Examples are:
- Impact.
- Ability.
- Risks.
- Team.
- Cost-effectiveness.
- Other items.
- Mentorship.
- Coaching.
- Technical resources.
- Creation of entrepreneurial opportunities.
- Other methods.
- We recommend that Major Grants are specifically for the advancement of the Zcash cryptocurrency and its ecosystem. The general mission of ZF is the advancement of financial privacy. This recommendation is more restrictive than that mission.
- Each Major Grant award is subject to individual approval by the ZF Board of Directors. The approval is by a majority that excludes any members with a conflict of interest.
- ZF must look for advisory input on its choice of Major Grant awards, through all effective and reasonable means. Examples are:
- On-line discussion forums.
- The community Advisory Board.
- On-chain voting by holders and miners.
- Proactive consultation with experts.
- ZF must try to create an independent grant committee to evaluate Major Grant proposals and recommend them publicly. The committee bases this work on its expertise and on the inputs above.
ZF must recognize the ZF-MG slice of the Dev Fund as a Restricted Fund donation under the above constraints (suitably formalized). Also, ZF must keep separate accounting of the balance and use of this slice, under its Transparency and Accountability obligations.
Grant proposers will send proposals for such grants through the usual grant process of ZF. With this process, public discussion and public funding are possible. The intent is that small one-time grants will be funded from the ZF-GU slice. (In that slice, these grants are also in competition with other ZF activities.) The intent is also that large long-duration grants will be funded from the dedicated ZF-MG slice. But this is at the discretion of ZF.
ZF must try to define target metrics and key performance indicators, and use these in its funding decisions.
Direct-grant option
An alternative is that the Major Grant funds are directly assigned to the grantees, and ZF does not accept and disburse them. This alternative can be considered better, operationally or legally. Thus, the mechanism that follows can be used in perpetuity, if ECC and ZF both agree to it before NU4 activation:
Before each Network Upgrade, the Foundation must publish a list that contains these items:
- The addresses of the grantees.
- The total number of Dev Fund ZEC per block that is intended for the grantees.
ECC and ZF must implement this list in all of their implementations of the Zcash consensus rules. Then, at the activation of the network upgrade, the miners will effectively ratify this decision.
Funding Target and Volatility Reserve
Each Dev Fund slice has a Funding Target. At first, the Funding Target is US $700,000 for each slice. At the end of each calendar month, the fair market value of the Dev Fund ZEC that was received in that month will be calculated. The recipient of the funds will put the excess over the Funding Target into a dedicated Volatility Reserve account.
Only that same party can withdraw funds from this account, and only in months when the monthly ZEC value is less than the Funding Target. Also, the party can withdraw only the amount that is necessary to cover that shortfall.
The Volatility Reserve can be kept as ZEC. Or it can be sold and kept as fiat currency or investments. (Profits from these investments will stay in the Volatility Reserve.)
The Funding Target can be changed only by unanimous agreement of all three of these:
- ZF.
- ECC.
- The majority vote of a voting mechanism that is weighted by ZEC coin holding.
This rule is meant to encourage the creation of such a voting mechanism. Also, if reserves accumulate excessively, the community can make an increase of the Funding Target conditional on the redirection of some of the reserves. The redirection can be to these destinations:
- A different entity.
- Miners.
- An airdrop.
The corresponding party will keep the received Dev Fund ZEC that is not in the Volatility Reserve and that is not yet used or disbursed. This ZEC is for later use under the terms of the corresponding slice. (The party keeps it as ZEC, or sells it and invests the money.)
The recipients must make irrevocable obligations to the above terms (for example, through their Operating Agreements or through the receipt of the slice as Restricted Funds).
Transparency and Accountability
Obligations
ECC, ZF and Major Grant recipients (during their award period and the time before it) must all accept these obligations.
These are the ongoing public reporting requirements:
- Quarterly reports that contain details about these items:
- Future plans.
- Execution on previous plans.
- Finances (balances, and spending divided into major categories).
- Monthly developer calls, or a brief report, about recent and future tasks. (Developer calls can be shared.)
- An annual detailed review of the performance and future plans of the organization.
- An annual audited financial report (IRS Form 990, or substantially similar information).
These reports can be organization-wide. Or they can be restricted to the income, expenses and work that are associated with the receipt of the Dev Fund.
It is expected that ECC, ZF and Major Grant recipients will be focused primarily on Zcash (in their attention and resources). Thus, they must promptly disclose these items:
- Any major activity that they do and that is not in the interest of the general Zcash ecosystem. This applies also to an activity that has no support from the Dev Fund.
- Any conflict of interest with the general success of the Zcash ecosystem.
ECC, ZF and grant recipients must promptly disclose any security or privacy risks that can have an effect on users of Zcash. (Where applicable, the disclosure is a responsible disclosure under confidence to the applicable developers.)
We recommend that the reports of ECC are at least as detailed as the grant proposals and reports of other funded parties. We recommend that the same applies to the annual report of ZF on its non-grant operations. Also, we recommend that these reports meet similar levels of public examination.
We recommend that all substantial software that was developed with Dev Fund money is released under an Open Source license (as the Open Source Initiative defines it). The preferred license is the MIT license.
Enforcement
For grant recipients, we recommend that these conditions are in their contract with ZF. We recommend that the contract has this result: if a substantial violation is not promptly corrected, the recipient will forfeit its grant funds, and these funds will go back to ZF.
ECC and ZF will make a contractual commitment to each other to obey these conditions and the prescribed use of funds. Under this commitment, if a party commits a substantial violation that is not promptly corrected, the other party will have permission to do these things:
- Issue a modified Zcash node implementation. In this implementation, the Dev Fund slice of the violating party is removed.
- Use the Zcash trademark for this modified implementation.
The funds of this slice will be reassigned to ZF-MG. (The integrity of ZF-MG is legally protected by the Restricted Fund treatment.)
Future Community Governance
In this ZIP, decentralized community governance is used in these places:
- As advisory input to the ZF-MG slice (Zcash Foundation, for major grants).
- To change the Funding Target and Volatility Reserve. (This is an incentive for ECC and ZF to create the voting mechanism.)
- In the future board composition of ZF (refer to the section below).
By the end of 2021, it is highly desirable to have these two results:
- Robust means of decentralized community voting and governance are developed.
- These means are integrated into all of the above processes.
We recommend that ECC and ZF give high priority to this development and its deployment, in their activities and in their grant selection.
ZF Board Composition
We recommend that ZF formally integrates robust means of decentralized community voting into its Board of Director elections, consistently with its mission and values. We recommend that ZF leads the process to determine and implement this, legally and technically, by the end of 2021.
Members of the ZF Board of Directors must not hold equity in ECC or have current business or employment relationships with ECC.
Grace period: board members who hold ECC equity (but do not have other current relationships with ECC) can dispose of their equity, or quit the Board, by 1 March 2021. (The grace period is for orderly replacement. The grace period is also time for an ECC corporate reorganization that is related to the receipt of the Dev Fund. This reorganization can have an effect on how the disposition of equity is done.)
Disclosures
The author has these roles:
- A coauthor of the Zerocash academic paper that is the basis of Zcash.
- A technical adviser to the Zcash Foundation.
- A founding scientist and a shareholder of the Electric Coin Company, and formerly a technical adviser to it.
- An academic researcher and adviser to various other organizations.
This ZIP is his private opinion. It does not represent any of the above.
Acknowledgements
This ZIP is most closely based on the Decentralizing the Dev Fee proposal of Matt Luongo, with substantial changes. It also includes elements from these sources:
- The 20% split between the ECC and the Foundation proposal of @aristarchus.
- The A Grand Compromise/Synthesis ZIP Proposal proposal of Josh Cincinnati.
- Extensive discussions in the Zcash Community Forum.
The author is grateful to all of the above for their excellent ideas and many insightful discussions. The author is also grateful to Howard Loo and to forum users @aristarchus and @dontbeevil for valuable initial comments on this ZIP.