This page is the Simplified Technical English version of ZIP 1011. The source ZIP is the normative text. Read the writing rules to understand the marked words.
ZIP 1011: Decentralize the Dev Fee
ZIP: 1011 Title: Decentralize the Dev Fee Owners: Matt Luongo <matt@thesis.co> Status: Obsolete Category: Consensus Process Created: 2019-09-27 License: MIT Discussions-To: <https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/decentralizing-the-dev-fee/35252> Pull-Request: <https://github.com/zcash/zips/pull/278>
Abstract
This ZIP contains a structure for Zcash governance. The structure includes these items:
- The funding and the management of new Zcash development.
- The decentralization of these development efforts.
- The resolution of governance hangups between the Zcash Foundation and the Electric Coin Company.
The method to accomplish these goals is a 20% dev fee. The dev fee is enacted in NU4, and its duration is one halving period. The recipients of the dev fee will be:
- A diverse group of development teams. The purpose is to make sure that Zcash keeps best-in-class research and engineering talent while it grows a robust ecosystem.
- The Zcash Foundation, with 25% of the dev fee.
- A newly established principal developer role, with 35% of the dev fee.
Motivation
Who am I?
My name is Matt Luongo. I am an entrepreneur. Since 2014, my full-time work is in the crypto space. I was a co-founder of Fold, a Bitcoin payments company. More recently, I was a co-founder of Keep, a private computation startup built on Ethereum.
At Keep, we did some work around Zcash. Our parent company, Thesis, considers a larger investment in Zcash development for our latest project.
I am deeply interested in privacy technology. For me, privacy is about consent. It is my consent to share these items:
- My habits.
- My beliefs.
- My preferences.
I see privacy as the inevitable next frontier in our pursuit of an economy with respect for individual choice.
My perspective is the perspective of a founder who wants to develop on Zcash. The company of this founder is a for-profit company with a focus on self-sovereign technology. We work in this space for ideological reasons, but our work is not free. To attract and grow talent, funding is necessary.
If you are interested in more information about my background, I introduced myself more properly on the forum.
What's this about?
After Zcon1, I started to look for a way to fund work on an Ethereum / Zcash bridge. I continue to look. I spoke to these persons and groups about the best way to move forward with this project:
- The ECC.
- The Zcash Foundation.
- A number of early Zcash community members.
During this process, I learned a lot about how the community works. I also learned how dev governance was structured up to now.
Inevitably, I became interested in the proposals of the community for a new dev fee. I thought about how the correct structure can support work like ours.
I believe that the Zcash community has an opportunity to deploy a new incentive structure. With this structure, companies like ours will have an incentive to build and improve Zcash. The result will be these improvements:
- A more resilient network.
- Stronger technology.
- Wider usage.
The Zcash narrative
We are all here to build a robust, private and decentralized currency. But the dev fee proposals that I saw up to now do not contain the idea of a Zcash narrative. Such a narrative is a way to make Zcash different from the competition.
There are many ZIPs about the future of Zcash. Of these ZIPs, only one has a strong narrative case. In this case, Zcash exists purely as a hedge against the long-term privacy failure of Bitcoin. Put simply, Zcash is "Bitcoin, but private".
We recommend that Zcash aims higher. Bitcoin is the only coin that successfully made a store of value argument. I like to call this argument "worse is better". The argument is as follows. Do not upgrade the network. Stability is more important than solutions to the problems of today.
Bitcoin chases the Lindy effect. With this effect, worse is better, and the network is stronger after each day of survival. That is great for Bitcoin. But for the rest of us, better is better. We recommend that Zcash is better.
Zcash has a reputation for the best technology in the space. One of the best teams in the space built this technology. We recommend that the Zcash community builds on that reputation with these actions:
- Develop the best research and engineering talent to take Zcash to the next level.
- Use a Zcash dev fee as a differentiator to build the best private medium of exchange in the world.
Principles of cryptocurrency governance
To understand Zcash governance, it is useful to examine "default" cryptocurrency governance. At this time, most proof-of-work chains have three major governing roles:
- Miners validate and secure the chain. They do some work to earn a reward. Miners are the first owners of newly minted coins. They are an integral part of network upgrades.
- Users buy, hold and spend the currency. In networks like Bitcoin, users also operate full nodes. Thus they decentralize validation and make the network more resilient.
- Developers maintain implementations to power the network and to interact with it. Usually, developers propose network upgrades.
On a chain like Bitcoin, each of these roles can veto a network upgrade.
- Miners can veto the activation of a new fork. To do this, they refuse to build off blocks that use new network rules. Thus they orphan a minority effort. They can also attack any fork attempt that does not change (The sentence is incomplete in the source document.)
- Users can veto a fork. To do this, they refuse to update their full nodes, and they reject blocks as invalid. The UASF movement demonstrated this when it successfully countered the SegWit2x attempt to force a Bitcoin hard fork. Users can also vote with their dollars. Thus, through market pressure, users act as a fork resolution of last resort.
- Developers can refuse to update the codebases of implementations to follow a fork. This veto can seem weak. But in practice, one of these is then necessary for any fork:
- A minimum of one additional development team.
- The agreement of the existing developers of implementations.
Together, these roles are a balance of power. With this balance, contentious forks are difficult. Any change that a large part of the users disapproves of is a possible cause of a chain split.
The state of play
In Zcash, two additional organizations skew this balance: the Electric Coin Company (ECC) and the Zcash Foundation.
Both organizations have these members:
- Zcash founders.
- Developers.
- Researchers.
- Privacy proponents.
These persons drove this ecosystem forward, and they represent its values. Nevertheless, at this time, their mode of operation is a cause of skew in the healthy balance of power in Zcash governance.
The mechanisms of that skew are:
- The Zcash trademark. The Foundation and the ECC hold it jointly.
- Primary implementation development. At this time, the ECC and the Foundation share it.
Miners, users and developers can have a disagreement. In such a disagreement, the Foundation and the ECC have the option to enforce the Zcash trademark. With this option, they can effectively select a winning fork against the will of the other parties in the disagreement.
Also, the Foundation is the only maintainer of the zebrad implementation. Thus the Foundation can "soft veto" a network upgrade.
Unfortunately, at this time the Foundation and the ECC are not organized as arms-length entities.
In this situation, there are a number of problems for new and existing Zcash users, and for both entities:
- Two entangled entities can override the will of users, or other parties can force them to override it. Because of this threat, self-sovereignty is undermined.
- The ECC and the Foundation are both at legal risk. They are entangled entities. Thus, when they try to minimize regulatory risk, they are remarkably similar to a single entity.
The "crowding out" problem
In the Zcash ecosystem as it exists today, there is little incentive for outside developers to participate.
Zcash development has a high learning curve:
- The reference implementation is a fork of the Bitcoin reference implementation. Its base is a decade of poorly written legacy code.
- The special contribution of Zcash involves a greater understanding of applied cryptography than most projects. After all, SNARKs are often still called "moon math".
- Full-stack privacy is hard. The recent network-level attack is a demonstration of this.
Before they can commit to the cost of that curve, most outside developers have to see a clear path to longer-term funding.
Even the developers who already have the expertise to work on this system are frustrated by the lack of longer-term funding. For evidence, look at the exit of Parity from Zcash after zebrad development. Also look at the struggles of Summa to work on Zcash.
To keep innovation and to build resilience, it is critical to attract talent to Zcash sustainably.
Requirements
The first requirement is a balanced governance structure. We recommend that developers get rewards, but governance capture gets no reward. We recommend that the best result for the chain and for ZEC holders always comes before commercial interests.
The second requirement, and a secondary one, is the funding of Zcash development. We recommend that a commercial entity does not run the chain. But commercial entities will have to support the chain.
The third requirement is support for a more resilient ecosystem, through these items:
- An end to the "crowding out" problem. The method is to pay development teams to work on and for Zcash.
- A dev fee management structure that is resilient to the loss, the capture or the compromise of the Zcash Foundation.
- An ecosystem that can survive the loss, the capture or the compromise of the ECC. The method is to encourage developer diversity and strategic input.
Finally, do not introduce unnecessary additional entities into the governance process.
Non-requirements
General on-chain governance is outside the scope of this ZIP. On-chain governance is an exciting idea. What if we had an impartial arbiter for development funding? But from my experience with on-chain governance up to now, I believe that it is still a risky direction. We recommend that Zcash focuses on its strength, privacy, and leaves the proof of on-chain governance models to other projects.
This ZIP is an attempt to outline a long-term structure for Zcash funding and governance. But the specification of the structure after the next 4 years is out of scope. In 4 years, much will be different. Perhaps this structure will be enough. Perhaps we will fight the Third Crypto War, and will have to go back to the drawing table.
Specification
The specification below is an effort to cleanly resolve the problems with the current governance of Zcash. At the same time, the effort has these aims:
- Keep a balance of power between stakeholders.
- Remove single points of failure or control.
- Grow the development and the usage of Zcash.
- Support the best interests of miners, users and developers today.
Decentralizing development
A few proposals include a mysterious "third entity". The purpose of this entity is to resolve disagreements between the Foundation and the ECC.
I prefer a different approach. In this approach, the role of the Foundation gets a new focus, and the ECC gets room to work with a robust developer ecosystem.
In this ZIP, the Foundation must support community development through these activities:
- The operation of the forum and of events.
- The collection of community sentiment.
- The management of short-term development grants.
- Research and development.
- The diligence behind the assignment and the disbursement of a dev fee.
The source of this dev fee must be 20% of the block reward. (In case of extraordinary growth in the price of ZEC, a maximum of half of the fee is burned.)
The Foundation must receive 25% of the dev fee. The monthly reward value is the dollar value of this share for a month, at the volume-weighted average price of ZEC over that month. If the monthly reward value is greater than $500k, the Foundation must set aside enough ZEC to make its maximum monthly budget equal to:
\[\mathsf{MaxBenefit}(\mathsf{RewardDollarAmount}) = \mathsf{min}\left(500000, 500000 * \sqrt{\frac{\mathsf{RewardDollarAmount}}{500000}}\right)\]
We recommend that the excess ZEC is restricted in purpose to the Foundation grants program. Thus these funds are earmarked to grow outside community talent and involvement.
With a cap on its monthly expenses, the Foundation will have less growth. The cap is also an incentive for fiscal discipline.
The remaining 75% of the dev fee must be distributed between development teams that maintain implementations.
- A maximum of 35% of the total fee must be reserved for the role of the "principal developer". The principal developer is a developer with assured long-term alignment with the project.
- The remaining 40% of the fee is the "outside development fee". This fee must be distributed between a minimum of two development teams that the Foundation selects semi-annually, at the time of network upgrades.
Before each network upgrade, the Foundation must recommend these items:
- A list of addresses.
- For each address, the total number of ZEC per block that the address is to receive from the dev fee.
The miners will "ratify" the recommendation at the activation of the network upgrade.
The role of dev fee recipients
Dev fee recipients are different from grant recipients in these aspects:
- The scope of their work.
- The timelines of their work.
- The specificity of direction.
The intent is that teams can focus on a core competency. The intent is also to encourage research and adjacent work.
The Foundation selects dev fee recipients semi-annually. The basis for the selection is their ability to move Zcash forward. Usually, recipients will be development teams. But we recommend an advantage for "full stack" teams that can do these things:
- Communicate well with the community.
- Expand Zcash usage.
- Widely share their work.
Recipients must send these items to the community:
- Quarterly plans for their efforts.
- Monthly progress updates.
All work with funds from the dev fee will be open source. Its licenses will be compatible with the existing Zcash implementations.
The Foundation must periodically judge the efficacy of dev fee recipients. But the role to decide on and drive roadmaps for Zcash is the role of the dev fee recipients, in partnership with the community. Users that operate full nodes, and miners, neatly balance this role. Each of these two groups can veto a network upgrade.
Dev fee recipients do not have to work exclusively on Zcash. But because of the nature of their work, recipients must give a guarantee: they are not obliged to the interests of competing projects.
The role of the principal developer
The principal developer is a "first among equals" in the group of dev fee recipients.
The principal developer must give a number of guarantees.
- Zcash must be their exclusive focus. As assurance, they must periodically send their financials to the Foundation.
- They must keep a well-run board and employ a qualified CFO.
- In addition to the existing open-source requirements, they must agree to assign any patents applicable to Zcash to the Foundation.
In exchange, the principal developer gets an indefinite dev fee allocation. The minimum allocation is 20%, and the maximum allocation is 35% of the total fee. The Foundation recommends the allocation annually.
The principal developer will have a wide remit for longer-term research that is applicable to Zcash. But the principal developer will send the same plans that are necessary from other recipients. The Foundation will recommend the removal of the principal developer only in extraordinary circumstances. Examples are:
- The principal developer reneges on the guarantees above.
- Extreme negligence.
Minimum viable Foundation
To manage the dev fee and to do its community and diligence duties, the Foundation must keep a board of 5 independent members. The board will have this structure, in the place of the structure in the current bylaws:
- 1 seat that ZEC holders directly vote on periodically.
- 1 seat for a representative of a newly created research advisory board. The primary role of this advisory board will be technical diligence of possible recipients of the dev fee.
- 1 seat for a member of the investment community.
- 2 seats that the board elects, with the same method that the bylaws contain for the selection of the board at this time. The board decides how to select these seats. Thus the selection can be through a community election, or through a direct vote of the remaining 3 seats.
A professional board is necessary for the Foundation. We recommend that candidates with existing formal board experience in the public or private sector get a strong preference in the selection of board members.
We recommend that board seats are rotated periodically, with terms and overlap that are long enough for consistent governance.
We recommend that each board member brings a unique network and a unique set of skills, to increase the impact of the Foundation.
A board member must not have an ongoing commercial interest in any recipient of the dev fee.
Because of their expertise, the Foundation must deliver a transition plan that includes these items:
- A board election schedule.
- A report on the feasibility of a future coin vote process to determine a board seat.
The ECC as the principal developer
I propose that the ECC is the initial principal developer. In this role, the ECC gets an indefinite dev fee allocation, in exchange for these items:
- The exclusive focus of the ECC on Zcash research and development.
- The assignment of all patents and marks applicable to Zcash to the Foundation.
I believe that this arrangement is the best for the Zcash ecosystem. With correct management of funds, I expect that this arrangement satisfies the ongoing requirements of the ECC.
The dev call
The Foundation must organize a bi-weekly call for all dev fee recipients and other third party developers. The call will be live-streamed for community participation. But only invited participants will speak. We recommend that a minimum of one representative from each dev fee recipient attends.
The Foundation must also keep a simple chat solution for the development of the protocol. We recommend that the public can view the chat logs. But it is not necessary that the chat is open to public participation.
Moving forward
I believe that this ZIP can be the basis for a new way forward for Zcash: a robust, decentralized ecosystem with fair governance. I also hope that, with this ZIP, the stakeholders in this discussion can come together. Then we can get back to why we are all here: to protect the financial privacy of the world.
I look forward to feedback on GitHub and on the Zcash forum.
Disclosures
In the interest of transparency, I want to make a few professional disclosures.
I am the largest shareholder of Thesis. Thesis is the parent company and studio behind Fold and Keep. Thesis is a for-profit company that can benefit from this ZIP as a dev fee recipient. Today I keep exclusive control of Thesis. But in the past, the company took outside investment.
About my financial interest in Zcash: I held a small amount of ZEC from a short time after the launch up to now. At this time, I build my personal ZEC position, and also a position at Thesis.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to these friends and colleagues for an early review of the text of this ZIP:
Thanks to my fellow dev fund ZIP authors. The ideas of each of them had an effect on this ZIP:
- Avichal Garg at Electric Capital.
- Antoinette Marie.
- Josh Cincinnati, ED at the Zcash Foundation.
- Jacob Phillips at Autonomous Partners.
- Andrew Miller.
- Chris Burniske.
- Eran Tromer.
- The fellows at Blocktown.
And of course, thanks to Sonya Mann and the Foundation for the coordination of discussions about these different proposals.
Outside the ongoing discussions in the forum and with other ZIP authors, I spoke with some prominent community members while I developed this ZIP. But none of them got early access to the text of the ZIP. I appreciated the thoughtful discussions with these persons:
- Josh Cincinnati.
- Zooko Wilcox.
- Josh Swihart.
- Ian Miers.
- Other persons.