Zcash in Simplified Technical English

This page is the Simplified Technical English version of ZIP 1010. The source ZIP is the normative text. Read the writing rules to understand the marked words.

ZIP 1010: Compromise Dev Fund Proposal With Diverse Funding Streams

ZIP: 1010
Title: Compromise Dev Fund Proposal With Diverse Funding Streams
Owners: Josh Cincinnati <josh@zfnd.org>
Credits: Matt Luongo
Eran Tromer
Andrew Miller
mistfpga
lex-node
and many others
Status: Obsolete
Category: Consensus Process
Created: 2019-08-31
License: MIT
Discussions-To: <https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/a-grand-compromise-synthesis-zip-proposal/34812>

Terminology

On this page, STE words are in the place of the BCP 14 key words of the source. Refer to the key word table.

In this ZIP, the term "network upgrade" has the meaning that is described in ZIP 200 [zip-0200].

Abstract

In this ZIP, I try to put together the best parts of different proposals. I propose a development fund (dev fund) of 20% of the block reward for 4 years.

The funds go to a trust that both the Electric Coin Company (ECC) and the Zcash Foundation (ZF) control. But strict controls apply to how the funds can be allocated.

The proposal has these results:

Motivation and Requirements

Zcash will not thrive without a dev fund. I wish that this was not true (I really do).

For a very long time, I was against the idea. But now I fear the alternative, with no dev fund. I fear that the privacy technology that Zcash pioneered will possibly never reach its true potential. This applies to our community, and also to other people who are interested in novel approaches to private money.

These groups gave many suggestions and guidelines for a possible dev fund:

Below is my attempt to synthesize them into a compromise that is greater than the sum of its parts:

Editor note: for security reasons, it can be useful to change the "single address" into a list of rolling addresses. Section 7.8 of the current protocol specification describes these addresses. Other references to a "single address" in this document are not changed.

Note: a previous version of this ZIP included a part of the funds that was tied to shielded adoption. This was based on ideas from Eran Tromer in [tromer-comment]. After many discussions, I started to worry about the gameability of the metric. Thus I decided to remove it completely.

Specification

From the NU4 network activation, 20% of the mining reward must go to a single shielded address that has these properties:

(After Blossom and after the halvening, 20% of the mining reward is 0.625 ZEC for each block.)

If the trust and its address are not established by the NU4 activation deadline, then there must not be any change to the mining reward.

Every quarter-year (105,000 blocks at the post-Blossom rate), until 4 years after NU4 activation (1,680,000 blocks at the post-Blossom rate), we recommend that the trust disburses funds as follows, with a public report necessary for each disbursement:

Editor note: When this ZIP was written, the expectation was that NU4 activation and the first halvening in October 2020 occur at exactly the same time. Possibly this is not the case. Thus I resolved a possible ambiguity in the original wording. I specified that the trust disburses funds for 4 years, and not until the second halvening in October 2024.

Example disbursements by the trust for a hypothetical 105000-block period

Every quarter, the trust gets 0.625 ZEC * 105000 = 65625 ZEC. If both the ECC and the Zcash Foundation meet the accountability requirements that the trust sets, the disbursements are as follows:

  • 19687.5 ZEC to the ECC, because the ECC meets the accountability requirements.
  • 19687.5 ZEC to the Zcash Foundation, because the Zcash Foundation meets the accountability requirements.
  • 26250 ZEC to ZF Grants, for disbursement to external individuals and organizations. (This amount goes through the Zcash Foundation as a restricted donation. But a body that is independent of both organizations determines the disbursements.)

In this example, the target block spacing does not change.

The trust's accountability requirements

Here I use parts of the guidance of the Foundation [zfnd-guidance]. But I add some stipulations for these purposes:

  • To make the independence of the Foundation firm.
  • To prevent hoarding of its endowment by the Foundation.
  • To handle the ECC as a for-profit.

Each quarter, before the trust disburses funds, the trust must validate that both the ECC and the Zcash Foundation did these items:

  • They published quarterly technical roadmap reports and financial reports. The financial reports give details of spending levels or burn rate, and of cash or ZEC on hand.
  • If this is the first disbursement in a calendar year: they published a yearly review of organization performance, similar to the "State of the Foundation" report of the Zcash Foundation [zfnd-state].

For the Zcash Foundation, the trust must also apply these requirements:

  • No board member can have an interest in the ECC. (For a current board member with an interest, it is necessary to dispose of the ECC holdings before the start of this dev fund. The other option is to leave the board.)
  • Except for money that is restricted for ZF Grants, the total assets of the Foundation must stay below $100mm. (If a disbursement ever makes its assets greater than this amount, the trust can direct the funds to an additional restricted ZF Grants donation.)

Also, for the ECC, the trust must validate these items before each disbursement:

  • If this is the first disbursement in a fiscal year: the ECC published yearly audited financial statements at the same level of detail as a public company. (The purpose is to mirror the Form 990 requirement of the Foundation as a 501(c)(3).)
  • The ECC received no outside investment while the ECC is an obligatory recipient of this dev fund.
  • No part of the dev fund went to these uses while the ECC is an obligatory recipient of this dev fund:
    • Dividends.
    • Profit-sharing.
    • Share or equity buybacks.
  • No ECC equity dilution occurred while the ECC is an obligatory recipient of this dev fund, except options or RSUs for new or existing employees.
  • There is no change of control (a change of majority control) at the ECC while the ECC is an obligatory recipient of this dev fund.

The ECC must share the necessary information with the trust, so that the trust can verify that there are no violations of the items above. But we recommend that the information itself (that is, the cap table and the detailed financials) stays private between the ECC and the trustees, unless there is a violation that is not cured.

What happens in the case of a violation

The violating party has 30 days to try to cure the violation (if a cure is possible). If the party cannot cure it, future funds must be redirected to ZF Grants through a restricted donation to the Zcash Foundation. (That is, neither the Zcash Foundation nor the ECC can use these funds. More about this is in the text below.)

The ZF Grants portion

A part of the dev fund goes to the Foundation, but with the express (and restricted) purpose of distribution through ZF Grants. (The trust must legally enforce this restriction.)

The Foundation continues to administer ZF Grants and to distribute the funds. But we recommend that the Foundation does not decide where those funds go. Also, the Foundation cannot be a recipient of these funds. Instead, the trust must demand that the ZF Grants process includes broader input, as described below.

In the discussions about the different "third party" proposals, some people suggested a 3-of-5 approach. In this approach, the ECC and the Zcash Foundation are in the minority. I think that this structure can work well for these funds.

These funds are not the full dev fund. Thus we limit the downside risk if we select the "wrong" third parties. As a result, we can also give those third parties more voice (we make them more numerous than the ECC and the Zcash Foundation).

The Foundation can also decide to fund ZF Grants beyond the restricted donations from the trust. But this is at the discretion of the Foundation.

Because of the discussion about the proposal of Matt Luongo, there is a good blueprint for how this group can work. I use some comments that I made in the thread about the proposal of Matt [acityinohio-comment]. I change them so that they apply to a Grant Review Committee for ZF Grants only, and not to the board of the Foundation.

The ZF Grant Review Committee has five members. The selection of the members is as follows:

  • 1 seat for the ECC. The appointed member can change, but the ECC keeps the power to select the member for the seat for 4 years.
  • 1 seat for the Zcash Foundation. The appointed member can change, but the Zcash Foundation keeps the power to select the member for the seat for 4 years.
  • 2 seats that ZEC holders vote on directly, elected every year. The Foundation holds open elections, similar to the 2018 advisory process that resulted in the election of Ian and Amber. But the vote is a direct ZEC coin-staked vote.
  • 1 seat for a technical member, elected every year. The combined group selects this member (the 2 coin-staked seats, the ZF seat and the ECC seat). The selection has an express focus on the ability to evaluate technical proposals.

The group meets biweekly to make funding decisions. The results are made public on ZF Grants. This idea comes from the recent proposal of Eran Tromer: the group has a goal of a minimum of two "Large Grants" every year. A "Large Grant" has an expected scope of six months and 1/4th to 1/3rd of the total yearly budget of ZF Grants. The goal is to get more dedicated external teams involved.

Rationale

There are scores of great ideas on the forums. I took the best parts of each into this ZIP (this selection is subjective, mind you). I hope that this ZIP meets the standards of these groups:

A word on the enigmatic "third party" floating around

Some people proposed a variant of a "2-of-3 multisig" decision-making process for all disbursement decisions. With all due respect to them, I think that this is a bad idea. This is a quote from one of my previous forum posts:

...2-of-3 multisig [is] better if we find the right third party. That in and of itself requires an additional process/mutual agreement between the three parties (which is much more difficult than a bilateral agreement), and as I’ve mentioned before in presentations in the past, 2-of-2 with known entities dedicated to Zcash is better than jumping straight to 2-of-3 with a third party hastily decided or staying with 1-of-1 entity trademarks and software development processes.

As for why 2-of-2 is still strictly better than 1-of-1: in the case of cryptocurrency governance, I believe that inaction in the case of disagreement is a better outcome than one party unilaterally exercising power.

More to the point, I worry that the "third party" in question is idolized into some Platonic ideal. I also worry about this result: in reality, the ECC or the Zcash Foundation spends much of its time to curry favor in the process or the selection of that party. This occurs in the limited time between now and the selection of that party.

The Zcash Foundation has the responsibility to represent community interests. Thus, from the perspective of the ECC, I am not sure why another community-focused representative really makes sense. If interests clash, the ECC is constantly outvoted. Thus, from a balance-of-power perspective, I am not sure why the ECC can find that tenable.

Also, I am not sure that the community wants the "third party" to be another profit-generating enterprise, for example a VC or another startup. Such a third party tips power in a different direction.

The center of this ZIP is still this idea: the Zcash Foundation and the ECC share responsibility for protocol development. This idea now has more support from the 2-of-2 agreement on the trademark. In this ZIP, I assume and expect that both continue to develop consensus-compatible node software that interacts with the Zcash network.

But in this ZIP, accountability is mandatory for the disbursement of funds to the ECC and the Zcash Foundation. Also, outside stakeholders get more input on the funds that are not earmarked for the ECC and the Zcash Foundation. (This is similar to the earlier version of the proposal of Placeholder, and to the current proposal of Matt Luongo.) A later migration to a broader "2-of-3" approach for future governance decisions stays possible.

Why a trust?

The main reason is to decrease complexity creep in consensus code. We do not try to put some complex on-chain mechanism for dev fund disbursements into the code. Instead, we can meet the NU4 with the simplest possible code change. Then we can spend more time to iron out the details of the trust "off-chain".

Both the ECC and the Zcash Foundation are based in the US. Thus, a trust with well-specified criteria for disbursements is a reasonable path. Also, a trust fits well with the proposal of lex-node [zip-1007] for legal covenants on funding.

Security and Privacy Considerations

The biggest issue is the custody of the funds that the trust controls. But I think that it is possible to manage this issue with a partnership with a custody partner.

Another issue is that it is necessary for the trust to verify and validate non-public information. But I think that this is a net positive for the community ("transparency for organizations, privacy for individuals").

Reference implementation

TBD. But I expect that the code is relatively simple to write in both zebra and zcashd.

Issues and further discussion

References

[BCP14]
Information on BCP 14 — "RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" and "RFC 8174: Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"
[zip-0200]
ZIP 200: Network Upgrade Mechanism
[zfnd-guidance]
Zcash Foundation Guidance on Dev Fund Proposals. Zcash Foundation blog, August 6, 2019.
[tromer-comment]
Comment on a post “How to hire ECC” in the Zcash Community Forum. Eran Tromer, August 11, 2019.
[restricted-funds]
“What Are Restricted Funds?” Foundation Group, last modified December 7, 2018.
[zfnd-grants]
ZF Grants — Funding for Zcash ecosystem projects
[zfnd-state]
The State of the Zcash Foundation in 2019. Zcash Foundation blog, January 31, 2019.
[acityinohio-comment]
Comment on a post “Decentralizing the Dev Fee” in the Zcash Community Forum. Josh Cincinnati, October 27, 2019.
[zip-1007]
ZIP 1007: Enforce Development Fund Commitments with a Legal Charter