This page is the Simplified Technical English version of ZIP 1009. The source ZIP is the normative text. Read the writing rules to understand the marked words.
ZIP 1009: Five-Entity Strategic Council
ZIP: 1009 Title: Five-Entity Strategic Council Owners: Avichal Garg <avichalgarg@electriccapital.com> Status: Obsolete Category: Consensus Process Created: 2019-08-28 License: MIT Discussions-To: <https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/dev-fund-proposal-5-entity-strategic-council-approach/34801>
Terminology
Key terms
- Developer Fund
- 20% of the mined ZEC in the four-year period from approximately October 2020 to October 2024. In this period, a maximum of 5,250,000 ZEC will be minted.
- Strategic Council
- A five-person committee that determines how to allocate the Developer Fund. The Strategic Council is held accountable to the community through regular elections.
- Executor
- An individual or an organization (for example, a group or a company) that receives funding from the Strategic Council. Executors are responsible for excellent execution. The Strategic Council holds Executors accountable.
Abstract
In this ZIP, 20% of the newly minted coins in each block are reserved for a Developer Fund. The community elects a five-person Strategic Council every two years.
Every six months, the Strategic Council determines these items for the ecosystem:
- The high-level strategy.
- The goals.
- The metrics to evaluate progress.
The Strategic Council is responsible for two tasks. It allocates funding to Executors for the next six months. It also summarizes the performance of Executors in the previous six months.
Every six months, Executors send proposals to the Strategic Council. The proposals include these items:
- Project plans.
- Funding plans.
- How the Executors will measure success on a scale from 1-10.
At the end of six months, Executors grade themselves. Then the Strategic Council summarizes what was accomplished. The target is 7/10 in every quarter on a roll-up basis. (The roll-up is a simple average of all of the outstanding projects for that six months.)
Out of Scope for this Proposal
These items are out of scope for this ZIP:
- How to do 1 person = 1 vote. (Possibly we cannot do this. Or possibly we recommend that we do not do this.)
- How to structure the Strategic Council legally. That is: do we recommend that the Strategic Council is a Swiss Foundation? And what types of legally binding responsibilities do the members of the Strategic Council have?
Motivation and Requirements
In this ZIP, I try to put on my startup CEO hat. I address the strategic challenges and the execution challenges that, I believe, prevented Zcash from reaching its full potential.
Principles & Observations Based on My Experiences (a.k.a. Biases?)
Layer 1 protocols are driven by network effects. Thus, a layer 1 protocol ultimately collapses if it does not have a quickly growing network effect in these groups:
- Miners.
- Developers.
- Users.
- Liquidity.
In a network-effect business, the primary cause of success is how quickly you grow the network effects.
To grow a network effect, you must have both the correct strategy and excellent execution. If your strategy is not correct, you will fail. The quality of your execution does not change this result. If your execution is not excellent, you will not be able to know the cause of a lack of progress. The cause can be poor execution or poor strategy.
Thus, to build the network effects that are necessary for the success of Zcash, we must answer five questions:
- Who determines the strategy?
- How do they decide on the strategy?
- How are they held accountable to having the correct strategy?
- Who executes?
- How are Executors held accountable to excellent execution?
1. Who determines the strategy?
- For a volunteer-based approach, it is necessary that individuals or entities can accumulate large quantities of the underlying coin. Bitcoin did this through obscurity. Grin does this through very high inflation in the early years. Zcash is past this phase. Thus, I do not believe that a volunteer-based approach can be effective. Thus, a developer fund (or a similar approach) is the only realistic option for Zcash today.
- With independent, high-quality governance, the decisions are better and the execution has higher quality.
- Ideally, we recommend that the recipients of the funds are different entities from the governance body that allocates the funds. The purpose is to avoid conflicts.
- If a decision-making process has too few people, the people can collude. If it has too many people, no work gets done.
- Good governance and leadership are a significant time commitment. Significant support and resources are also necessary for them.
- We recommend that many different perspectives are represented. These perspectives include the perspectives of these groups:
- Miners.
- Developers.
- Regulators.
- Users.
2. How do they decide on the strategy?
- Flexibility in how funds are used is important. Strategies and markets change over time, and we recommend that we can change with them. Thus, we recommend that we do not put limits in advance on how funds are used.
- We recommend that there is no limit on the use of all of the funds in any time period.
- To create and help a decentralized ecosystem of miners and developers is important for the long-term health of the ecosystem.
- With a regular and predictable cadence for plans and goals, it is easy for teams to build and ship. Also, teams can recover between intense periods of building.
- Transparency in these items has the highest importance:
- The strategy.
- The decision making of fund recipients.
- How funds are distributed.
3. How are they held accountable to having the correct strategy?
- We recommend that organizations and individuals do not have a permanent seat on a decision-making body. Regular elections are a force for good behavior.
- Third-party audits of financial behavior are a force for good behavior and a source of transparency.
- We recommend that it is possible to remove bad actors from any decision-making body for very bad violations of trust or for misbehavior.
4. Who executes?
- We recommend that any person can participate in the execution.
- We recommend that, over time, the best Executors accumulate reputation and can receive more funds.
- It is valuable to have Executors in many geographic areas and in many different entities.
- It is valuable to identify Executors who have long-term commitments to Zcash. These Executors will be available for long-term support and maintenance of their work.
5. How are Executors held accountable to excellent execution?
- Excellent execution comes from verifiable hypotheses that have data as support, and from clear milestones.
- It is necessary that Executors send concrete plans with clear goals and metrics. It is also necessary that Executors are judged on these two items:
- Were the goals reasonable?
- Did the Executors accomplish those goals? (Ideally, this is measurable with metrics.)
- The best way to measure execution is to define the success criteria and failure criteria in advance. The definition comes before the challenges of the task have an influence on it.
Specification
1. Who determines strategy?
- The Strategic Council is a board of five persons or entities. Five persons are better than three, to keep collusion to a minimum.
- We recommend that the Strategic Council gets a two-year term. Thus, we can change people in the middle if necessary. There are no permanent seats.
- For the votes that determine the seats (and not for the votes of the seats on issues), the recommendations are as follows:
- We recommend that one of the five seats is allocated for miners, and that the vote for this seat is signaled through nodes.
- We recommend that the vote for one of the five seats is weighted by ZEC holdings, so that 1 ZEC = 1 vote.
- We recommend that the votes for three of the five seats are on the basis of 1 person = 1 vote.
- We recommend that elections are open, so that any person or entity can be a candidate for a seat.
- A seat on the Strategic Council is a paid position. The payment comes from Developer Fund emissions. The amount of compensation is to be determined.
2. How do they decide?
- 20% of block rewards are allocated for the Developer Fund.
- We recommend that there is no limit in advance on where money can go. For example, possibly in one year it is sensible to invest only in the protocol. In a different year, possibly it is sensible to invest in user adoption through these methods:
- Content marketing.
- SEO.
- SEM.
- Other methods.
- Every six months, the Strategic Council has a responsibility to publish these items:
- An update to the strategy.
- The key metrics that are tracked.
- The key metrics to hit as goals in the next six months.
- Every six months, the Strategic Council runs a process. In this process, any person can send proposals. Each proposal contains how the sender can best accomplish these strategic objectives and hit those metrics and milestones.
- A maximum of 33% of funds can go to one entity for development purposes. With this limit, decentralization stays broad. Also, with this limit, the ecosystem has a reason to identify new participants.
How are they held accountable for having the correct strategy?
- The community elects the Strategic Council every two years.
- A third-party audit firm audits all decisions and finances.
- There is an annual meeting of all stakeholders (possibly at Zcon?). The meeting has these purposes:
- Feedback.
- Q and A of the Strategic Council.
- A walk-through of what was accomplished in the last six months, and of the proposals for the next six months, for feedback.
4. Who executes?
- Individuals, teams or companies from any location can send these items:
- A proposal. The proposal can be aligned with the strategy, or not aligned with it.
- A budget for what they want to do.
- Their success criteria on a scale of 1-10 (refer to the text below).
- Executors can send plans that can take longer than 6 months to complete. The reason is that the reality of hiring and funding employees can make a longer-term financing commitment necessary. We recommend that the Strategic Council can use its judgment to approve these types of investments. But we recommend that the Strategic Council also makes intermediate milestones and grading necessary on the 6-month time horizon.
- We recommend that companies of these types get encouragement to participate:
- Companies that have sustainable business models and can support or subsidize engineers to work on Zcash.
- Companies that have adjacent businesses that can benefit from investment in this technology.
- Ideally, the Strategic Council also encourages non-technical execution. Examples of this execution are:
- Education.
- Video series.
- Regulatory progress.
- Other items.
5. How are they held accountable to excellent execution?
- At the end of six months, all proposals are graded 1-10. Each team agrees in advance on the results for a grade of 0, 3, 7 or 10/10. Then, when the results are due in 6 months, the team can move the grade up or down a little. If a team agrees in advance that some results are a 3, and then tries to give itself an 8, this looks suspicious. Also, it can have an effect on future funding.
- We recommend that the Strategic Council targets an average score of 7/10 for that six months across all Executors. If we score too high, our goals are not sufficiently ambitious. If we score too low, we tried to do too much, or we had a fundamental misunderstanding of our goals.
- Over time, the Strategic Council decides who gets funds. As a result, under-performers will be removed. Thus, the Strategic Council holds Executors accountable. The community holds the Strategic Council accountable.
Issues & Further Discussion
Raised objections, issues, and open questions:
- How can we create a process to amend this process? Possibly, we want one of these rules:
- 4/5 of the Strategic Council approve changes.
- 2/3 of ZEC holders can amend the charter of the Strategic Council.
- If necessary, how do we recall or impeach the members of the Strategic Council before the end of their term?
- I am sure that there are many other points of ambiguity, and many improvements that we can make. This system can even have critical design flaws or failures. I appreciate feedback.
References / Background
- https://www.zfnd.org/blog/multisig-governance/
- https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/placeholder-considerations-resources-governance-and-legitimacy-in-nu4/34045
- https://electriccoin.co/blog/ecc-initial-assessment-of-community-proposals/
- https://medium.com/@socrates1024/here-are-a-couple-of-points-on-framing-the-discussion-of-a-potential-new-dev-fund-in-zcash-c13bcbf4ed5b
- https://forum.grin.mw/t/solved-early-disappointments/3682
- https://www.electriccapital.com/ (for disclosure of investments we’ve made).
Editor note: we recommend that these items become inline references.
Change Log
- 2019-08-27: Initial draft. Thanks to @jubos, @puntium, @zooko, @joshs and Jack Gavigan. They helped me to state my ideas more clearly and to put them in the ZIP format. These ideas are only mine. None of these individuals influenced them.
- 2019-08-28: The document was updated to the ZIP format.
- 2019-09-15: Finally, the document was sent as a pull request on GitHub. Feedback from @daira and @str4d was incorporated.