Zcash in Simplified Technical English

This page is the Simplified Technical English version of ZIP 1004. The source ZIP is the normative text. Read the writing rules to understand the marked words.

ZIP 1004: Miner-Directed Dev Fund

ZIP: 1004
Title: Miner-Directed Dev Fund
Owners: Andrew Miller (@amiller on zcash forums)
Status: Obsolete
Category: Consensus Process
Created: 2019-06-19
License: public domain
Discussions-To: <https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/dev-fund-proposal-miner-directed-dev-fund-was-20-to-any-combination-of-ecc-zfnd-parity-or-burn/33864>

Terminology

On this page, STE words are in the place of the BCP 14 key words of the source. Refer to the key word table.

For clarity, this ZIP has these definitions:

2nd Halvening Period
The period of 4 years from approximately October 2020 to approximately October 2024. During this period, a maximum of 5,250,000 ZEC is minted.
DF%
Dev Fund Percentage. This is the part of the newly minted ZEC in each block that is reserved for a development fund.
MR%
Miner Reward Percentage. This is the part of the newly minted ZEC in each block that is given to miners. Thus DF% + MR% = 100%.

Abstract

In this ZIP, a part (20%) of the newly minted coins in each block is reserved for the development fund. A fixed set of developer entities is eligible to receive these funds. The fund is miner-directed: the miner of each block can decide how to allocate these funds to eligible developers.

Out of Scope for this proposal

Motivation

The motivation for this ZIP is the same as for most development fund proposals. Newly minted coins can be used to employ developers who continue to improve Zcash. This use has a possible value to the Zcash community [amiller-notes].

This ZIP is different from most other development fund proposals: it has a fine-grained "opt-in" feature [acityinohio-comment]. It has this feature because miners can decide to give a small amount of development funding, or no development funding.

Requirements

Simplicity
A design goal of this ZIP is that it is simple to define and implement. The design does not contain much process for on-chain or off-chain governance.
Opt-in
The proposed development fund is not mandatory, because miners can decide to allocate no funds at all to the developer entities.
Incentive-compatible
Miners cannot directly pay the development fund to themselves.

Specification

During the 2nd Halvening Period, a fixed part (DF% = 20%) of the newly minted coins in each block is reserved for a Miner-Directed Dev Fund (MDDF). A hardcoded set of developer entities is eligible to receive funding from the MDDF. In the code, each entity is represented by its t-address or z-address public key. These are examples of these entities:

The fund is "miner-directed": the miner of each block selects how to allocate the MDDF coins among the developer entities. To do this, the miner simply creates outputs in the coinbase transaction. The DF% is a maximum. Miners can also "opt out": they mint a lower number of coins for the MDDF, or no coins at all.

The scope of this ZIP is explicitly limited to the 2nd Halvening Period. After the end of this period, all of the block reward in each block is awarded to the miner. The upper limit on the rate of newly minted coins must stay the same as before this ZIP. That is, a maximum of 25 ZEC is minted for each 10 minutes during the 2nd Halvening Period.

Implementations can define a default opt-in allocation. (An example is DF%/2 to the Electric Coin Company and DF%/2 to the Zcash Foundation.)

We recommend that implementations have a configuration option to change the allocation. A change with this option has priority over any such default.

Examples

These examples are illustrations of how miners can create the outputs of the coinbase transactions to allocate the MDDF to eligible developers.

Assume that Dev1 and Dev2 are the hardcoded addresses of eligible developers. Assume that Miner is the address of the mining pool that mines this block.

Assume that the total newly minted coins are 3.125 ZEC for each block during the 2nd Halvening Period. (This value includes the effect of the change to a 75-second target block spacing after the Blossom Network Upgrade [zip-0208].) Also assume that DF% = 20% and MR% = 80%.

Example 1: Split equally between two developers

The transaction outputs of the coinbase transaction are these:

  • 2.5 ZEC to Miner
  • 0.3125 ZEC to Dev1
  • 0.3125 ZEC to Dev2.

Example 2: Opt-out of the development fund

The transaction output of the coinbase transaction is this:

  • 2.5 ZEC to Miner.

Issues and Further Discussion

People raised these objections and issues:

References

[BCP14]
Information on BCP 14 — "RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" and "RFC 8174: Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"
[amiller-notes]
Notes on reaching agreement about a potential Zcash development fund. Andrew Miller, June 3, 2019.
[acityinohio-comment]
Comment on a post “The future of Zcash in the year 2020” in the Zcash Community Forum. Josh Cincinnati, June 3, 2019.
[blocktown-summary]
Executive Summary: Blocktown Proposal for Zcash 2020 Network Upgrade. Blocktown Capital, August 15, 2019.
[zip-0208]
ZIP 208: Shorter Block Target Spacing

Change Log

2019-06-19
The first version was posted.
2019-08-28
  • The text was changed to be more like a ZIP draft.
  • The name was changed to Miner-Directed Dev Fund.
  • The references to "Burn" were removed. Opt-out is now in terms of coins that are never minted.
2019-08-29
  • Informal feedback from before the ZIP draft was addressed.
  • An example and the requirements were added.
  • An incomplete sentence about default allocations was repaired.
2019-09-15
The document was moved to GitHub.