This page is the Simplified Technical English version of ZIP 1004. The source ZIP is the normative text. Read the writing rules to understand the marked words.
ZIP 1004: Miner-Directed Dev Fund
ZIP: 1004 Title: Miner-Directed Dev Fund Owners: Andrew Miller (@amiller on zcash forums) Status: Obsolete Category: Consensus Process Created: 2019-06-19 License: public domain Discussions-To: <https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/dev-fund-proposal-miner-directed-dev-fund-was-20-to-any-combination-of-ecc-zfnd-parity-or-burn/33864>
Terminology
On this page, STE words are in the place of the BCP 14 key words of the source. Refer to the key word table.
For clarity, this ZIP has these definitions:
- 2nd Halvening Period
- The period of 4 years from approximately October 2020 to approximately October 2024. During this period, a maximum of 5,250,000 ZEC is minted.
- DF%
- Dev Fund Percentage. This is the part of the newly minted ZEC in each block that is reserved for a development fund.
- MR%
- Miner Reward Percentage. This is the part of the newly minted ZEC in each block that is given to miners. Thus DF% + MR% = 100%.
Abstract
In this ZIP, a part (20%) of the newly minted coins in each block is reserved for the development fund. A fixed set of developer entities is eligible to receive these funds. The fund is miner-directed: the miner of each block can decide how to allocate these funds to eligible developers.
Out of Scope for this proposal
- At this time, this ZIP does not contain a process to reach agreement on the fixed set of development entities. It also does not contain a process to change that set.
-
This ZIP does not contain a recommended process for miners to make a decision about how to direct the development fund. It also does not contain a recommended method for developers to ask miners to direct the fund.
Other development fund proposals include specific processes for accountability and to support community decisions. These are examples of such processes:
- Monthly developer calls.
- Lists of planned features and goals.
- Other items.
Each of these processes can also be compatible with this ZIP, in these ways:
- The process is a source of non-binding advice for miners.
- The process is a means to reach agreement on the defaults of implementations.
- The process is a guide for the selection of the fixed set of developers.
- Other ways are also possible.
- This ZIP only contains a guideline for the 2nd Halvening Period.
Motivation
The motivation for this ZIP is the same as for most development fund proposals. Newly minted coins can be used to employ developers who continue to improve Zcash. This use has a possible value to the Zcash community [amiller-notes].
This ZIP is different from most other development fund proposals: it has a fine-grained "opt-in" feature [acityinohio-comment]. It has this feature because miners can decide to give a small amount of development funding, or no development funding.
Requirements
- Simplicity
- A design goal of this ZIP is that it is simple to define and implement. The design does not contain much process for on-chain or off-chain governance.
- Opt-in
- The proposed development fund is not mandatory, because miners can decide to allocate no funds at all to the developer entities.
- Incentive-compatible
- Miners cannot directly pay the development fund to themselves.
Specification
During the 2nd Halvening Period, a fixed part (DF% = 20%) of the newly minted coins in each block is reserved for a Miner-Directed Dev Fund (MDDF). A hardcoded set of developer entities is eligible to receive funding from the MDDF. In the code, each entity is represented by its t-address or z-address public key. These are examples of these entities:
- Electric Coin Company.
- Zcash Foundation.
- Parity.
- Other entities.
The fund is "miner-directed": the miner of each block selects how to allocate the MDDF coins among the developer entities. To do this, the miner simply creates outputs in the coinbase transaction. The DF% is a maximum. Miners can also "opt out": they mint a lower number of coins for the MDDF, or no coins at all.
The scope of this ZIP is explicitly limited to the 2nd Halvening Period. After the end of this period, all of the block reward in each block is awarded to the miner. The upper limit on the rate of newly minted coins must stay the same as before this ZIP. That is, a maximum of 25 ZEC is minted for each 10 minutes during the 2nd Halvening Period.
Implementations can define a default opt-in allocation. (An example is DF%/2 to the Electric Coin Company and DF%/2 to the Zcash Foundation.)
We recommend that implementations have a configuration option to change the allocation. A change with this option has priority over any such default.
Examples
These examples are illustrations of how miners can create the outputs of the coinbase transactions to allocate the MDDF to eligible developers.
Assume that Dev1 and Dev2 are the hardcoded addresses of eligible developers. Assume that Miner is the address of the mining pool that mines this block.
Assume that the total newly minted coins are 3.125 ZEC for each block during the 2nd Halvening Period. (This value includes the effect of the change to a 75-second target block spacing after the Blossom Network Upgrade [zip-0208].) Also assume that DF% = 20% and MR% = 80%.
Example 1: Split equally between two developers
The transaction outputs of the coinbase transaction are these:
- 2.5 ZEC to
Miner - 0.3125 ZEC to
Dev1 - 0.3125 ZEC to
Dev2.
Example 2: Opt-out of the development fund
The transaction output of the coinbase transaction is this:
- 2.5 ZEC to
Miner.
Issues and Further Discussion
People raised these objections and issues:
-
Miners can have bad incentives. Examples are these incentives:
- An incentive to block all development of Proof-of-Work alternatives. Examples of these alternatives are GPU-friendly variants or Proof-of-Stake.
- An incentive to extort more funds. An example is this demand: "We’ll direct all 20% of the development fund to DeveloperX, but only if they promise to keep just 5% and pass 15% back to the mining pool.”
- An incentive to block the development fund because of greed.
- This ZIP changes the terms of what some people can think of as a social contract. The issuance schedule ends when all 21 million ZEC are minted. With the original code in Zcash implementations, miners get a total of 90% of all minted coins by that end. With this ZIP, less reward is available to miners than with the original minting schedule.
- Several others suggested that a 20% development fund is a precedent for a permanent 20% development fund. An important example is the Blocktown Capital proposal [blocktown-summary]. The scope of this ZIP is explicitly limited to the 2nd Halvening Period. Thus, if this ZIP alone is adopted and there are no more updates, the development fund ends in 2024.
References
- [BCP14]
- Information on BCP 14 — "RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" and "RFC 8174: Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"
- [amiller-notes]
- Notes on reaching agreement about a potential Zcash development fund. Andrew Miller, June 3, 2019.
- [acityinohio-comment]
- Comment on a post “The future of Zcash in the year 2020” in the Zcash Community Forum. Josh Cincinnati, June 3, 2019.
- [blocktown-summary]
- Executive Summary: Blocktown Proposal for Zcash 2020 Network Upgrade. Blocktown Capital, August 15, 2019.
- [zip-0208]
- ZIP 208: Shorter Block Target Spacing
Change Log
- 2019-06-19
- The first version was posted.
- 2019-08-28
-
- The text was changed to be more like a ZIP draft.
- The name was changed to Miner-Directed Dev Fund.
- The references to "Burn" were removed. Opt-out is now in terms of coins that are never minted.
- 2019-08-29
-
- Informal feedback from before the ZIP draft was addressed.
- An example and the requirements were added.
- An incomplete sentence about default allocations was repaired.
- 2019-09-15
- The document was moved to GitHub.