Zcash in Simplified Technical English

This page is the Simplified Technical English version of ZIP 1003. The source ZIP is the normative text. Read the writing rules to understand the marked words.

ZIP 1003: 20% Split Evenly Between the ECC and the Zcash Foundation, and a Voting System Mandate

ZIP: 1003
Title: 20% Split Evenly Between the ECC and the Zcash Foundation, and a Voting System Mandate
Owners: aristarchus (zcash forums)
Status: Obsolete
Category: Consensus Process
Created: 2019-06-19
License: MIT
Discussions-To: <https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/dev-fund-proposal-20-split-between-the-ecc-and-the-foundation/33862>

Terminology

On this page, STE words are in the place of the BCP 14 key words of the source. Refer to the key word table.

The author of this ZIP gives these definitions of terms, for clarity:

2nd Halvening period
The 4-year period of time from approximately October 2020 to approximately October 2024. In this period, a maximum of 5,250,000 ZEC will be minted.
3rd Halvening period
The 4-year period of time from approximately October 2024 to approximately October 2028.
DF%
Dev Fund Percentage. This is the part of the newly minted ZEC in each block that is reserved for a development fund.

Abstract

This ZIP contains a proposal for a 20% Dev Fund Percentage during the 2nd Halvening period. This percentage is split evenly between the Electric Coin Company (ECC) and the Zcash Foundation.

This ZIP has these aims: to be simple to implement, and to have no single point of failure. It also contains mandates for transparency and accountability. It also contains a mandate to build a voting mechanism for the development fund. This voting mechanism is for use during the 3rd Halvening period.

The design of this ZIP is a balance between two goals:

Motivation

This ZIP has these strengths:

  1. It is simple to implement. The author prefers that developers use their time to scale Zcash, and not to implement the development funding mechanism.
  2. Developers will have several years to work on a very good decentralized voting mechanism for development funding.
  3. 20% is a sufficiently large percentage. With this percentage, there will probably be sufficient development funding for many different ZEC price scenarios. The author has this message for persons who want to decrease this percentage: to overpay for security is a gift to miners. This gift is bad for each other stakeholder in the Zcash community. The author even makes this strong statement: to intentionally overpay the miners for security is to steal from the other stakeholders.
  4. Two entities receive funds. Thus there is no single point of failure.

Requirements and Specification

  1. DF% must be 20 percent, split evenly between ECC and the Zcash Foundation during the 2nd Halvening period.
  2. The Dev Fund must only be spent on these activities for Zcash:
    • research
    • development
    • adoption
  3. A voting system for development funding must be built and implemented, so that it can be used during the 3rd Halvening period.

Voting System Requirements

The general properties of the mandated voting mechanism follow. The author does not want to specify the technical implementation details. The author thinks that the engineers who build this system are the correct persons for this job.

  1. We recommend that voting is private.
  2. Only ZEC holders can vote.
  3. We recommend that voting occurs on-chain.
  4. To vote, you must lock your ZEC so that it cannot be spent for a period of time. The purpose is to force the voters to have ‘skin in the game’. A second purpose is that a person with bad intentions cannot do this: buy a lot of ZEC just before an election, then sell all of it immediately after.
  5. Voters can select how long to lock their ZEC. The voting power of a voter is proportional to the time that the ZEC is locked. For example, person A votes with 10 ZEC and locks it for 6 months. Person B votes with 20 ZEC and locks it for 3 months. A and B have the same voting power. There must be a maximum lock time, possibly one year. The purpose of this maximum is that no person can get ‘infinite’ voting power from a permanent lock of their ZEC.
  6. We recommend that the final results of the vote are transparent to all persons, and that all persons can verify them.
  7. We recommend that the system is fully open, and that any person or any organization can compete for funding to develop Zcash.

Transparency and Accountability for the ECC and the Zcash Foundation

These requirements apply to ECC and to the Zcash Foundation. The mandate is to obey the accountability requirements that follow. The Foundation first proposed these requirements:

  • Monthly public developer calls about the current technical roadmap and updates.
  • Quarterly technology roadmap reports and updates.
  • Quarterly financial reports that contain the spending levels (burn rate) and the cash and ZEC on hand.
  • A yearly, audited financial report, similar to the Form 990 for US-based nonprofit organizations.
  • Yearly reviews of organization performance, similar to the State of the Zcash Foundation report [zfnd-state].

Requirements Specifically for the ECC

The Zcash Foundation proposed that the ECC become a non-profit organization [zfnd-guidance]. That proposal is the motivation for the general requirements that follow. These requirements apply to the ECC if the ECC selects to receive funds and work for ZEC holders.

  1. The author shares the concern of the Foundation that the ECC can be “beholden to its shareholders”. Thus the author mandates this: the ECC works in the service of the Zcash community and serves no other masters. We recommend that these persons do not have control over the use of the new development funds: the original investors or founders who no longer work in the service of the Zcash community.
  2. We recommend that the revenue from the Dev Fund is not used to give more rewards, even indirectly, to the persons that follow. These persons do not work on Zcash after the first halving, and each one is one of these persons of the ECC:
    • the investors
    • the founders
    • the shareholders
    These persons already received the Founders’ Reward. This new development fund is not intended to give them more benefit.
  3. We recommend that the ECC offers competitive pay and a stake in the upside of the success of Zcash, to attract the best and brightest. The author wants the ECC to be able to keep a world class team that can compete with the tech giants of the world (Google, Apple and other companies).
  4. We recommend that the ECC continues to engage with regulators and speaks in support of privacy preserving technology. The legal structure of the ECC must not have a bad effect on these critical efforts in any way.

The author does not mandate non-profit status for the ECC. Possibly that is the best legal structure. Possibly a different structure is better.

Finally, if the voting system is not implemented by the start of the 3rd Halvening period, we recommend that these funds are not minted: the 20% of funds that were intended for the ‘voting development fund’.

References

[BCP14]
Information on BCP 14 — "RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" and "RFC 8174: Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"
[zfnd-state]
The State of the Zcash Foundation in 2019. Zcash Foundation blog, January 31, 2019.
[zfnd-guidance]
Zcash Foundation Guidance on Dev Fund Proposals. Zcash Foundation blog, August 6, 2019.

Change Log

2019-06-19
The first version was posted.
2019-26-07
A list of three strengths of this ZIP was added.
2019-08-13
The section "Voting System Requirements" was added.
2019-08-20
The section "Requirements Specifically for the ECC" was added.
2019-08-29
The document was updated to be more similar to a ZIP draft.