Zcash in Simplified Technical English

This page is the Simplified Technical English version of ZIP 257. The source ZIP is the normative text. Read the writing rules to understand the marked words.

ZIP 257: Deployment of the Orchard Temporary Vulnerability Mitigation and NU6.2 Network Upgrade

ZIP: 257
Title: Deployment of the Orchard Temporary Vulnerability Mitigation and NU6.2 Network Upgrade
Owners: Daira-Emma Hopwood <daira@jacaranda.org>
Status: Final
Category: Consensus / Network
Created: 2026-06-09
License: MIT
Discussions-To: <https://github.com/zcash/zips/issues/1293>

Terminology

On this page, STE words are in the place of the BCP 14 key words of the source. Refer to the key word table.

In this document, the term "network upgrade" has the definition in ZIP 200 [zip-0200].

The character § is used for references to sections of the Zcash Protocol Specification [protocol-2026.7.0].

The terms "Mainnet" and "Testnet" have the definitions in § 3.12 ‘Mainnet and Testnet’ [protocol-networks].

Abstract

This ZIP is a retrospective record of the deployment of the Orchard temporary vulnerability mitigation and of the NU6.2 network upgrade.

Motivation

On 2026-05-29, the security researcher Taylor Hornby reported a soundness vulnerability in the Orchard Action circuit implementation. At that time, Taylor Hornby had the task to do an AI-assisted security audit of the Orchard shielded protocol. The details of the vulnerability are in the work log of Taylor Hornby [Hornby2026] and in GHSA-ww9q-8r59-xv46 [GHSA-circuit].

With this vulnerability, balance violation and theft of funds were possible. Thus it was absolutely necessary to disable the use of Orchard immediately. The use of Orchard was to stay disabled until the deployment of a corrected Orchard Action circuit in the NU6.2 network upgrade.

(One alternative was to disable the vulnerable circuit and to activate the new circuit at the same time. This alternative was rejected for two reasons. First, with this alternative, there was a risk that the vulnerability became known before its mitigation. Second, the goal was to close the vulnerability window more quickly, while the fix was still in preparation and in review.)

Specification

Orchard temporary vulnerability mitigation

Consensus rule: From block height 3363426 (Mainnet) or 4048500 (Testnet) onward, until NU6.2 activation on each network, v5 and later transactions must not contain any Orchard Action descriptions. That is, \(\mathsf{nActionsOrchard} = 0\).

The Mainnet mitigation was deployed as an emergency hotfix in zcashd v6.12.5 and zebra v4.5.3 [GHSA-zcashd] [GHSA-zebra]. These releases did not have the restriction "until NU6.2 activation". That is, with these releases, Orchard stayed disabled until the deployment of the later releases. Note that zcashd v6.12.4 also contained other security fixes. The description of these fixes is in ZIP 256 [zip-0256].

Before that, zcashd v6.12.4 used a Mainnet activation height of 3363366. This height is 60 blocks earlier than 3363426. Some mining pools did not upgrade in time. Thus the activation was attempted again at the block height above, and this attempt was successful.

With these emergency hotfixes, the soft fork was active only on Mainnet. In these hotfixes, the Testnet mitigation height was not set.

On Testnet, the soft fork took effect through zcashd v6.20.0 and zebra v5.0.0 instead. In these releases, the Testnet mitigation height was 4048500. These releases also added support for NU6.2. These releases were published before Testnet reached block height 4048500. Thus on Testnet, the disabling of Orchard and its later re-activation at NU6.2 (block height 4052000) occurred as an ordinary scheduled activation, and not as an emergency response.

NU6.2 deployment

At the NU6.2 network upgrade, the Orchard shielded protocol becomes active again. In comparison with the original Orchard rules, there are two consensus changes:

  • The variable-base scalar multiplication gadget of the Orchard Action circuit is corrected. With this correction, the soundness vulnerability is fixed. Because of this correction, the Orchard verifying key is different.

    A pre-NU6.2 Action proof is valid only under the historical (insecure) verifying key. An Action proof from NU6.2 onward is valid only under the corrected verifying key. The fix was published in halo2_gadgets v0.5.0 [halo2-0.5.0] and orchard v0.14.0 [orchard-0.14.0].

  • From the activation of NU6.2, an Orchard Action proof must have the canonical length for the corrected circuit. Before NU6.2, this length was not enforced as a consensus rule [GHSA-zebra].

From the activation of NU6.2, the temporary mitigation no longer applies. Transactions that contain Orchard Action descriptions must again be accepted, with their proofs subject to verification under the corrected circuit and the canonical-length rule. NU6.2 was deployed in zcashd v6.20.0 and zebra v5.0.0.

The primary sources of information about the NU6.2 consensus protocol changes are the Zcash Protocol Specification [protocol-2026.7.0] and this ZIP.

The network handshake mechanism and the peer management mechanism in ZIP 201 [zip-0201] also apply to this network upgrade.

These are the network upgrade constants [zip-0200] for the NU6.2 network upgrade:

CONSENSUS_BRANCH_ID
0x5437F330
ACTIVATION_HEIGHT (NU6.2)

Testnet: 4052000

Mainnet: 3364600

MIN_NETWORK_PROTOCOL_VERSION (NU6.2)

Testnet: 170150

Mainnet: 170150

For each network (Testnet and Mainnet), nodes compatible with NU6.2 activation on that network must advertise a network protocol version of MIN_NETWORK_PROTOCOL_VERSION (NU6.2) for that activation, or greater.

Zcash Protocol Specification changes

The changes to the Zcash Protocol Specification that follow correspond to the two NU6.2 consensus changes above. These changes are relative to version 2026.6.4 of the specification [protocol-2026.6.4]. Version 2026.7.0 [protocol-2026.7.0] of the specification includes these changes.

Consensus rule for the temporary vulnerability mitigation

Add a consensus rule to § 7.1.2 ‘Transaction Consensus Rules’ [protocol-txnconsensus]:

[Pre-NU6.2] From block height 3363426 (Mainnet) or 4048500 (Testnet) onward, until NU6.2 activation on each network, if \(\mathsf{effectiveVersion} \geq 5\) the transaction must not contain any Orchard Action descriptions. That is, \(\mathsf{nActionsOrchard} = 0\).

Orchard Action verifying key selection

Because of the correction to the Orchard Action circuit, the Orchard Action verifying key is different after NU6.2 activation.

In § 4.1.13 ‘Zero-Knowledge Proving System’ [protocol-abstractzk], replace this sentence:

We also omit subscripts on \(\mathsf{ZKAction.Prove}\) and \(\mathsf{ZKAction.Verify}\).

Use this sentence in its place:

Subscripts on \(\mathsf{ZKAction.Prove}\) and \(\mathsf{ZKAction.Verify}\) are not omitted, because more than one version of the \(\mathsf{Orchard}\) circuit was deployed.

In § 4.6 ‘Action Descriptions’ [protocol-actiondesc], make the two changes that follow.

Before "An Action description comprises", add this text:

Let \(\mathsf{vk}\) be the halo2 verifying key that is identified by the Orchard circuit version, as specified in the consensus rules below.

Replace the last consensus rule with these three rules:

  • [NU5 to NU6.1 inclusive, pre NU6.2] \(\mathsf{vk}\) must be the key that is identified by \(\texttt{OrchardCircuitVersion::InsecurePreNU6\_2}\).
  • [NU6.2 onward] \(\mathsf{vk}\) must be the key that is identified by \(\texttt{OrchardCircuitVersion::FixedPostNU6\_2}\).
  • The proof \(\pi\) must be valid for the verifying key \(\mathsf{vk}\), given a primary input \((\mathsf{cv}, \mathsf{rt}^{\textit{OrchardPool}}, \mathsf{nf}, \mathsf{rk}, \mathsf{cm}_x, \mathsf{enableSpends}, \mathsf{enableOutputs})\). That is, \(\mathsf{ZKAction.Verify_{vk}}\big(\kern-0.1em(\mathsf{cv}, \mathsf{rt}^{\textit{OrchardPool}}, \mathsf{nf}, \mathsf{rk}, \mathsf{cm}_x, \mathsf{enableSpends}, \mathsf{enableOutputs}), \pi\big) = 1\).

In § 4.18.4 ‘Action Statement (\(\mathsf{Orchard}\))’ [protocol-actionstatement], add a vulnerability disclosure. Use a style similar to the style of the disclosure for \(\mathsf{BCTV14}\) in § 5.4.10.1. This is the disclosure:

Vulnerability disclosure: The pre-NU6.2 Orchard Action circuit had a soundness bug in its variable-base scalar multiplication gadget [GHSA-circuit]. With this bug, balance violation was possible. The bug is only in the circuit implementation. The Action statement that is specified above is as intended.

The corrected circuit that was deployed at NU6.2 has a different verifying key. Thus a pre-NU6.2 Action proof is valid only under the insecure pre-NU6.2 key. An Action proof from NU6.2 onward is valid only under the corrected key. The two circuits are different only in the additional copy constraints [halo2-commit]. These constraints were added to make the circuit sound. The consensus rule about the key that is used for verification is in § 4.6 ‘Action Descriptions’.

Canonical Orchard Action proof length

Add a consensus rule in § 7.5 ‘Action Description Encoding and Consensus’ [protocol-actionencodingandconsensus]:

  • [NU6.2 onward] The \(\mathtt{proofsOrchard}\) field must have the canonical length of \(2720 + 2272 \cdot \mathtt{nActionsOrchard}\) bytes.

Add a non-normative note:

  • Before NU6.2, the length of the \(\mathtt{proofsOrchard}\) field was not enforced as a consensus rule. The canonical length depends on the circuit. The canonical length is the same for the pre-NU6.2 circuit and the post-NU6.2 circuit. Refer to § 5.4.10.3 ‘Encoding of \(\mathsf{Halo\;2}\) Proofs’ [protocol-halo2encoding]. In that section, the encoding of a \(\mathsf{Halo\;2}\) proof is the proof byte sequence itself.

Backward compatibility

Before the activation of the network upgrade on each network, NU6.2 nodes and pre-NU6.2 nodes are compatible and can connect to each other. But NU6.2 nodes prefer to connect to other NU6.2 nodes. Thus NU6.2 nodes disconnect pre-NU6.2 nodes in the period before activation. (In practice, this effect was limited because, before the activation, the fix was at first distributed only to a subset of nodes. Time constraints were the cause of this limited distribution.)

After the activation of the network upgrade, pre-NU6.2 nodes can still accept the numerically larger protocol version of NU6.2 as valid. But NU6.2 nodes always disconnect peers that use lower protocol versions.

References

[BCP14]
Information on BCP 14 — "RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" and "RFC 8174: Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"
[protocol-2026.6.4]
Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2026.6.4 [NU6.1]
[protocol-2026.7.0]
Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2026.7.0 [NU6.2]
[protocol-networks]
Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2026.7.0 [NU6.2] or later. Section 3.12: Mainnet and Testnet
[protocol-abstractzk]
Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2026.6.4 [NU6.1]. Section 4.1.13: Zero-Knowledge Proving System
[protocol-actiondesc]
Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2026.6.4 [NU6.1]. Section 4.6: Action Descriptions
[protocol-actionstatement]
Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2026.6.4 [NU6.1]. Section 4.18.4: Action Statement (\(\mathsf{Orchard}\))
[protocol-halo2encoding]
Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2026.6.4 [NU6.1]. Section 5.4.10.3: Encoding of \(\mathsf{Halo\;2}\) Proofs
[protocol-txnconsensus]
Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2026.6.4 [NU6.1]. Section 7.1.2: Transaction Consensus Rules
[protocol-actionencodingandconsensus]
Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2026.6.4 [NU6.1]. Section 7.5: Action Description Encoding and Consensus
[zip-0200]
ZIP 200: Network Upgrade Mechanism
[zip-0201]
ZIP 201: Network Peer Management for Overwinter
[zip-0256]
ZIP 256: Deployment of Consensus Bug Fixes Between NU6.1 and NU6.2
[orchard-0.14.0]
orchard v0.14.0 release (zcash/orchard#500)
[halo2-0.5.0]
halo2_gadgets v0.5.0 release (zcash/halo2#888)
[halo2-commit]
zcash/halo2 PR 888, commit d8e48ef. halo2_gadgets: Anchor variable-base scalar-mul incomplete-addition base
[Hornby2026]
Taylor Hornby — work log for the Orchard counterfeiting vulnerability
[GHSA-circuit]
GitHub Security Advisory ww9q-8r59-xv46: Missing copy constraint in halo2_gadgets variable-base scalar multiplication allows under-constrained base, breaking Orchard Action circuit soundness
[GHSA-zcashd]
GitHub Security Advisory ghc3-g8w4-whf9: Urgent zcashd hotfixes v6.12.4 and v6.20.0
[GHSA-zebra]
GitHub Security Advisory jfw5-j458-pfv6: Zebra vulnerability remediation for the soundness flaw in the pre-NU6.2 Orchard Action circuit